In his interesting and helpful paper 'McNaughton and Rawling on the Agentrelative/Agent-neutral Distinction,' Douglas Portmore criticizes our formalization of duties on the grounds that we have overlooked an important class of conditional cases in which the antecedent of the conditional falls outside the scope of the deontic operator.
When conditionals enter into talk of reasons, we have been inclined to read the reasons as conditional rather than conditioned. As Portmore points out, this might lead to trouble. Consider first his:
(7a) (x)(y)(x is y's foster parent xR[y feels cherished]) (7b) (x)xR[(y)(x is y's foster parent y feels cherished)]
Suppose that a foster parent finds cherishing somewhat onerous, then (7b) apparently permits (objectionably) the foster parent to return the foster child to the system in light of his (the foster parent's) reasons. The foster parent has reason to ensure that: either he does not foster this child or he cherishes her. And he can bring about the truth of this proposition by returning the foster child to the system. (7a), on the other hand, states that foster parents have reason to cherish their foster children simpliciter.
Matters might actually be more counterintuitive than Portmore supposes for those who would force conditional readings. The appropriate formulation is:
Analogous reasoning applies in the case of (7b): the appeal that blocks the move to a reason to return one's foster child blocks the formulation of the reason to cherish as (7b) in the first place.
In the case of (9b), the reasons that Kuwaitis have to fight the Iraqi invaders might be based on various considerations: patriotism, resistance to bullying, or preservation of autonomy, perhaps.
But these serve to underpin a reason to fight, not a reason to ensure that: either one is not Kuwaiti or one fights, and hence (9b) is ruled out.
Thus we are inclined to agree with Portmore that (9b) Portmore's (9a) uses 'S' rather than 'R,' however (where, recall, 'S' abbreviates 'should, pro tanto, ensure to the best of her ability that'). So perhaps his original formulation is true.
Portmore sees (9a) as true because a Kuwaiti incapable of fighting can nevertheless be ensuring to the best of his ability that he fights the Iraqi invaders even though he does nothing. However,
we not only think it false that an agent can have reason to do something of which she's incapable, we also think it false that an agent should ensure to the best of her abilities that she do something of which she's incapable. (Or, for those who prefer to think in terms of imperatives here, commands to phi where phi-ing is impossible lack the appropriate force.) Thus we think both formulations of (9a) are false. The insertion of the phrase 'to the best of her ability' into the 'S'
operator is designed to cover cases where the agent can only partway ensure, or merely increase the likelihood of, the truth of the relevant proposition (as in ensuring that happiness is maximized, or that nobody lies, or that your children thrive). Whilst it is true that someone incapable of phi-ing can be ensuring to the best of her ability that she phi (by sleeping, for instance), it is false that she should be so ensuring, and false that she has a reason to so ensure.
(Cases of genuine absolute incapability in our sense are rare, of course: the parent in a famine stricken country can often do something toward ensuring that her children do not starve, for example.)
We think, then, that both (9a) and (9b) We turn finally to the modification of our account of the agent-relative/agent-neutral distinction in light of conditioned reasons. We shall combine our original formulation (call this 'C1'):
A statement of the form It is AN otherwise (We use 'A(y…)' and 'B(y…)' to denote formulae that contain zero or more free variables that do not include x, and '(y…)' as the quantifier binding these. Below we shall have recourse to the notation 'A(x)' (etc.), which denotes a formula in which exactly x occurs free ii .)
There are, however, two difficulties to overcome. First, as Portmore notes (note 9)
is equivalent to
Thus there is a danger that a theory comprising only a statement that has the latter form will be classified as AR even if [B] contains no free occurrence of x. Portmore attempts to overcome this by insisting that the universal reasons statements be written as 'concisely as possible.' Whilst conciseness might cope with this specific difficulty, it will not cope with all instances of the general problem that some systems can be written in both AR and AN forms. For example, we Whereas the deontologist insists that each agent has special underived reason to ensure that she does not lie, which is formulated: The former states that lifeguards have reason to ensure that nobody drowns; the latter is the AN thought that we all have reason to encourage lifeguards to ensure that nobody drowns. (The consequentialist does not insist that we all plunge in to save the drowning; rather, although we have the common aim (cf Parfit, 1984) of ensuring that nobody drowns, this is best accomplished by encouraging those in the appropriate position to fulfill their role.)
This list of variants and their AN transforms is not complete, but we leave the remaining cases as an exercise for the reader.
